Parliament is keen to break the collegium system and take on the mantle of appointing Supreme Court judges. This will make the Prime Minister head of the Supreme Soviet in India. Making CONTINGENT CONTRACTS between lawyers and clients legal will bring on real reform
Pay lawyers upon success of the case OR as a percentage of the money recovered in the case in court. Do not pay the lawyer per hearing or per case filing. This is what making contingent contracts legal between lawyers and their clients entails. As of now, contingent contracts in India between advocates and clients are illegal. This should change. Write to your member of Parliament about this.
Today, the current system in India where the lawyer is paid by the client per case filing and per hearing is detrimental to an efficient and just judicial system. This way both advocates and judges feel it in their interest to let a case drag on. In a lot of cases, low level magistrates are reportedly and allegedly convinced by lawyers to pass a judgement in their favour. How this is done is anybody’s guess. There is no timeline and there is no public scrutiny in court cases. The media does not take interest in justice but just reports the progress of the case per hearing only if it involves big money and big names.
When the Indian Parliament speaks of judicial reform, it often means something else — not justice, not efficiency, not accountability, but control. The current political push to “reform” the judiciary by breaking the collegium system and replacing it with a politically supervised appointments mechanism is not reform. It is regression. It risks turning India’s judiciary from a (still) semi-independent guardian of rights into an administrative arm of the executive — where judges would look up to the Prime Minister, not the Constitution.
Judicial reform is urgently needed in India, but not in this direction. Real reform lies not in who appoints judges, but in how justice is delivered, how quickly, and how fairly. The only genuine path toward reform is structural — through incentive-based reform. Making contingent contracts between lawyers and clients legal, transparent, and regulated could revolutionize access to justice, reduce case backlogs, and align the interests of the lawyer, client, and justice itself.
The Mirage of “Breaking the Collegium”
The collegium system — where judges appoint judges — has long been controversial. Critics argue it lacks transparency and accountability. Proponents defend it as the last institutional barrier against political interference. The debate resurfaced with the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) case of 2015, when the Supreme Court struck down the NJAC Act and the 99th Constitutional Amendment as unconstitutional.
In Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (2015), the five-judge bench held that the NJAC violated the basic structure of the Constitution — particularly the independence of the judiciary. The Court reasoned that vesting political representatives (the Law Minister and two eminent persons appointed by a committee dominated by politicians) with veto power over judicial appointments would undermine that independence.
Parliament now seeks to revisit that decision, perhaps through fresh legislation or a constitutional amendment, portraying it as “reform.” But as history shows — from Indira Gandhi’s 1970s supersession of judges to the Emergency-era constitutional amendments — whenever political control over the judiciary increases, the ordinary citizen’s protection decreases. Breaking the collegium would not make justice faster. It would simply pass the power to harass victims from judges to politicians and bureaucrats. The common man will gain nothing.
The Real Problem: India’s Judicial Inefficiency
According to the National Judicial Data Grid (NJDG), as of 2025, more than 5 crore (50 million) cases are pending in Indian courts. Over 70% of these are in lower courts, where cases often languish for years. Civil disputes — property, inheritance, contract enforcement — drag on for decades, sometimes outliving the litigants themselves.
One of the main reasons for this chronic delay is the per-hearing payment model. In India, most lawyers charge clients per appearance or per filing, not per outcome. This structure creates an incentive to prolong litigation, not resolve it. A lawyer benefits more from a case that runs for years than one that concludes swiftly.
Moreover, since clients are billed regardless of result, there is no risk-sharing mechanism. For poor or middle-class litigants, this makes justice financially exhausting. The rich can afford justice; the rest must endure it. The system, thus, is built on the wrong incentives — rewarding delay, not efficiency.
Contingent Contracts: A revolutionary, all-encompassing and single point reform
A contingent contract, in legal parlance, is one whose performance depends on the occurrence (or non-occurrence) of a future uncertain event. In the context of law practice, it means that a lawyer’s payment depends on the outcome of the case — for example, a percentage of the damages recovered or a fee payable only if the case succeeds.
In most of the developed world — including the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia — such arrangements, known as contingency fees or conditional fee agreements (CFAs), are legal and regulated. These systems make legal representation accessible to those who cannot afford hourly or per-hearing fees.
- The United States: Contingency as Access to Justice
In the U.S., contingency fee agreements have long been the foundation of civil litigation. Lawyers, particularly in tort, consumer, or class-action suits, often work on a “no win, no fee” basis, typically charging 20–40% of the amount recovered.
This system has democratized access to justice. A poor worker injured in an industrial accident can sue a billion-dollar corporation without paying upfront. The lawyer takes the risk, and if the case succeeds, both benefit. If it fails, the client owes nothing.
Critics argue it leads to frivolous lawsuits, but courts and bar councils have developed mechanisms to prevent abuse. The result? Speedier settlements, more accountability, and a genuine deterrent against wrongdoing by corporations and governments.
2. The United Kingdom: The “Success Fee” Model
The U.K. introduced Conditional Fee Agreements (CFAs) in 1995, later expanded under the Access to Justice Act, 1999. Lawyers can charge a “success fee” — an uplift on their normal fee if they win — while clients are often insured against losing costs.
The British model balances lawyer motivation with consumer protection, allowing the legal system to remain efficient without encouraging speculative litigation. Importantly, CFAs made legal aid accessible even after state funding was reduced.
3. Australia and Canada: The Hybrid Approach
Australia permits contingency fees in several states under regulation. In Victoria, for instance, a “percentage-based fee agreement” allows law firms to claim a fixed share of damages, but only under judicial oversight. Canada follows similar rules, with contingency agreements subject to court approval to prevent exploitation.
4. India: The Vacuum
In contrast, India’s Bar Council of India Rules (Part VI, Chapter II, Section II) prohibit lawyers from entering into fee arrangements contingent upon the outcome of a case. Rule 20 explicitly states: “An advocate shall not stipulate for a fee contingent on the results of litigation or agree to share the proceeds thereof.”
This colonial-era rule was designed for a time when the profession was dominated by elites, not for a democracy with millions seeking affordable justice. Today, it perpetuates inequity.
Case Histories: How the Current System Fails
1. The Uphaar Cinema Fire Tragedy (1997–2023)
The families of victims fought for over two decades before the Delhi High Court and Supreme Court. Despite strong public sentiment, the case moved at a glacial pace. Lawyers were paid per hearing; justice was priced per adjournment. Only after 26 years did a partial closure arrive — too late for many parents.
2. The Bhopal Gas Tragedy (1984–2010)
Victims of the world’s worst industrial disaster had to rely on government litigation and foreign lawyers. American contingency lawyers helped victims recover compensation in the U.S., whereas Indian victims had no such access domestically because contingent contracts were illegal here. The result: meagre settlements and decades of delay.
3. Property and Contract Cases in Civil Courts
Every day, lower courts across India see property disputes, tenancy battles, and contract enforcement cases dragging on for decades. A single adjournment can take six months. A study by the Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy found that over 60% of civil cases take more than 5 years to resolve — not because of complexity, but because delay benefits everyone except the litigant.
Contingent Contracts Could Transform the System
Legalizing and regulating contingent contracts in India would realign incentives across the justice chain:
- Lawyers would work faster.
- Clients would take informed risks.
- Judges would face fewer frivolous cases.
- Media and public interest would shift.
- Transparency would improve.
Addressing the Critics
Opponents argue that contingent contracts could commercialize justice or encourage “ambulance chasing.” But that risk already exists in India’s current system — where lawyers advertise through intermediaries, solicit cases, and drag hearings indefinitely.
The solution is regulation, not prohibition. India could adopt models from the U.K. or Australia, where success fees are capped (say, 25–35%) and subject to judicial review. Bar Councils can establish an online registry of contingent agreements to prevent abuse.
Moreover, such contracts can coexist with Legal Aid and Lok Adalat systems, expanding access for those who otherwise cannot afford representation.
Judicial Reform Must Be Economic Reform
Judicial reform is not just a matter of court structure or judge appointments. It is about economic justice. A sluggish judiciary deters investment, weakens contract enforcement, and erodes business confidence.
The World Bank’s “Ease of Doing Business” reports have consistently rated India poorly in “Enforcing Contracts.” Even as India leaped in other indices, contract enforcement ranks remain among the bottom 30%. That reflects not corruption, but inefficiency — a system where justice delayed is the norm.
Legalizing contingent contracts would unleash a new legal services economy — where outcomes, not appearances, define professionalism.
Learning from Landmark Cases
The Indian judiciary has itself recognized the need for speed and transparency in justice delivery:
- Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar (1979) established the right to a speedy trial as a fundamental right under Article 21.
- Imtiyaz Ahmad v. State of U.P. (2012) urged the government to increase judge strength and resources to clear pendency.
- Common Cause v. Union of India (2018) reiterated the importance of accountability and efficiency in judicial processes.
But these judgments address symptoms, not incentives. Unless the fee structure changes, inefficiency remains profitable.
A New Framework for India
A pragmatic framework for contingent contracts in India could look like this:
- Legal Recognition under the Advocates Act and Bar Council Rules.
- Percentage Cap — e.g., not more than 25% of recovery in civil cases.
- Mandatory Disclosure to a Bar Council registry.
- Judicial Oversight in approving such agreements in sensitive cases.
- Ban on Criminal Contingencies — limited to civil, commercial, and tort cases.
This would align India’s system with international best practices while protecting clients from exploitation.
Conclusion: Reform the Incentives, Not the Appointments
Breaking the collegium is not judicial reform. It is judicial capture. Real reform begins by dismantling perverse incentives that reward delay and punish efficiency.
India’s courts need more judges, more transparency, and above all — better economics. A contingent contract system would bring that change. It would make justice measurable, affordable, and fair.
In a democracy, justice must not be for sale — but neither should it be unaffordable. Contingent contracts strike that balance. They reward truth, not time; fairness, not formality.
If Parliament truly wishes to reform the judiciary, let it not play politics with appointments. Let it play fairness with outcomes. That alone will make justice in India not a privilege, but a right.
